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Toal: Self-Defense in South Carolina

SELF-DEFENSE IN SOUTH CAROLINA
I. INTRODUCTION

The principles of la* governing self-defense1 and related
areas involving justifiable use of force have been laid down in
early South Carolina cases and followed in later cases with little
discussion of underlying policy questions. This note undertakes
first to state what the law of self-defense is in South Carolina
and second to discuss policy considerations in three areas in
which the author feels different rules could be justified. Other
possible changes in the law of self-defense, such as giving the
original aggressor a modified right of self-defense when the
other person switches from moderate to deadly force, deserve
scrutiny, but only the most pressing problems have been discussed in this note.
H. ELEmNTS OF SEY-DmL

NsE

A. Introduction
The plea of self-defense is an affirmative defense. It is a perfect defense when all of the elements are established by the
defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. 2 A mere preponderance is sufficient; it need not be "such a preponderance
as that the jury shall come to the conclusion beyond a reasonable
doubt.., that the defendant is guilty." 3 To make out a plea of
self-defense in South Carolina four things must be shown: First,
the person must have thought the action necessary to prevent
bodily harm or death; second, a person of ordinary reason and
firmness in similar circumstances must think the action necessary; third, the person must have been without fault in bringing
1. "Self-defense", as used in this introductory paragraph, has the broad
meaning: "The right of a man to repel force by force even to the taking of
life in defense of his person, property or habitation, or of a member of his

family . . . ." When used elsewhere in the note, "self-defense" has the limited
meaning of "an excuse for the use of force in resisting an attack on the
person ....
BLAcK'S LAW DIcnoNwARY 1525 (4th ed. 1951).
2. State v. Osborne, 202 S.C. 473, 25 S.E.2d 561, cert denied, 320
U.S. 763 (1943) ; State v. Strickland, 147 S.C. 514, 145 S.E. 404 (1928) (discussing only the element of fault); State v. Jones, 90 S.C. 290, 73 S.E. 177
(1912) ; State v. Stockman, 82 S.C. 388, 64 S.E. 595 (1909); State v. Thrailkill, 71 S.C. 136, 50 S.E. 551 (1905) ; State v. Petsch, 43 S.C. 132, 20 S.E. 993

(1895) ; State v. McIntosh, 40 S.C. 349, 18 S.E. 1033 (1894); State v. Way,
38 S.C. 333, 17 S.E. 39 (1893); State v. Bodie, 33 S.C. 117, 11 S.E. 624
(1890); State v. Welsh, 29 S.C. 4, 6 S.E. 894 (1888).

3. State v. Summers, 36 S.C. 479, 486, 15 S.E. 369, 371 (1892)..
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on the difficulty; and fourth, the person must have attempted to
retreat prior to using force calculated to bring about death or
great bodily harm.
Related defenses of resisting unlawful arrest, use of force in
effecting arrest, defense of others, and defense of habitation are
discussed in detail in the context of fault in bringing on the
difficulty.
B. Necessity
"The plea of self defense rests upon the idea of necessity ... 1,4
Perhaps all the elements of self-defense could be summed up in
the word "necessity." For convenience, however, the element of
faultlessness in bringing on the incident, called a "self-produced
necessity, " 5 and the element of retreat, which, if possible,
negatives the necessity for bloodshed, are placed in separate sections. The "necessity" which this section treats is the necessity
of the present situation, regardless of prior events or possible
avenues of retreat. To establish the right to self-defense the

defendant must show that he thought his actions necessary to
prevent bodily harm or death.6 The necessity may be either real
or apparent. 7 Evidence of threats previously communicated by
the deceased are admissible to show the defendant's belief of
impending danger.8 A prior threat alone is insufficient unless
accompanied by a demonstration of an immediate intention to
execute that threat. 9 Mere knowledge of previous misconduct is
4. State v. Wyse, 33 S.C. 582, 594, 12 S.E. 556, 559 (1891).
5. State v. Trammell, 40 S.C. 331, 18 S.E. 940 (1894) (headnote 1 to
South Carolina Reports).
6. E.g., State v. Osborne, 202 S.C. 473, 25 S.E.2d 561, cert. denied,
320 U.S. 763 (1943); State v. Osborne, 200 S.C. 504, 21 S.E.2d 178 (1942) ;
State v. Herron, 116 S.C. 282, 108 S.E. 93 (1921) ; State v. Gandy, 113 S.C.
147, 101 S.E. 644 (1919) ; State v. Watson, 94 S.C. 458, 78 S.E. 324 (1913) ;
State v. McKellar. 85 S.C. 236, 67 S.E. 314 (1910); State v. Stockman, 82
S.C. 388, 64 S.E. 595 (1909) ; State v. Foster, 66 S.C. 469, 45 S.E. 1 (1903) ;
State v. Sullivan, 43 S.C. 205, 21 S.E. 4 (1895) ; State v. Wyse, 33 S.C. 582,
12 S.E. 556 (1891) ; State v. McGreer, 13 S.C. 464 (1880).
7. State v. Jackson, 227 S.C. 271, 87 S.E.2d 681 (1955) ; State v. Burnett,
210 S.C. 348, 42 S.E.2d 710 (1947) ; State v. Osborne, 202 S.C. 473, 25 S.E.2d
561 (1942), ccrt. denied, 320 U.S. 763 (1943) ; State v. McGee, 185 S.C. 184,
193 S.E. 303 (1937) ; State v. Blackstone, 157 S.C. 278, 154 S.E. 161 (1930) ;
State v. Davis, 121 S.C. 350, 113 S.E. 491 (1922) ; State v. Herron 116 S.C.
282, 108 S.E. 93 (1921) ; State v. Brown, 113 S.C. 513, 101 S.E. 847 (1919) ;
State v. Jones, 90 S.C. 290, 73 S.E. 177 (1911) ; State v. Miller, 73 S.C. 277, 53
S.E. 426 (1906) ; State v. Foster, 66 S.C. 469, 45 S.E. 1 (1903) ; State v. Wyse,
33 S.C. 582, 12 S.E. 556 (1891).
8. State v. Mason, 215 S.C. 457, 56 S.E.2d 90 (1949) ; State v. Faile, 43 S.C.
52, 20 S.E. 798 (1895) (dictum).
9. E.g., State v. Heyward, 197 S.C. 371, 15 S.E.2d 669 (1941).
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insufficient to show a brief in the necessity to act. 10 If this
necessity is shown, the defendant must also show that a man
ordinarily constituted," or a man having an ordinary amount
of two of the following characteristics would have believed it
necessary to act if similarly situated: courage,'

judgment, 14

prudence, 15

discretion,'

6

and

2

firmness,' 3

reason. 17

C. Fault in Bringing on the Difficulty
1. Generally. A person claiming the right of self-defense must
be without fault in bringing on the difficulty. 18 This means
that the defendant must not have been the aggressor nor have
provoked the difficulty himself.' 9 Thus the use of language rea10. E.g., State v. Emerson, 78 S.C. 83, 58 S.C. 974 (1907).
11. State v. Rish, 104 S.C. 250, 88 S.E. 531 (1916).
12. State v. Jackson, 227 S.C. 271, 87 S.E.2d 681 (1955) ; State v. Burnett,
210 S.C. 348, 42 S.E.2d 710 (1947); State v. Osborne, 200 S.C. 504, 21
S.E.2d 178 (1942) ; State v. Brown, 113 S.C. 513, 101 S.E. 847 (1920) ; State
v. Gandy, 113 S.C. 147, 101 S.E. 644 (1919) ; State v. Holls, 108 S.C. 442, 95
S.E. 74 (1918) ; State v. Coyle, 86 S.C. 81, 67 S.E. 24 (1910) ; State v. Foster,
66 S.C. 469, 45 S.E. 1 (1903).
13. State v. Jackson, 227 S.C. 271, 87 S.E.2d 681 (1955) ; State v. Osborne,
200 S.C. 504, 21 S.E2d 178 (1942); State v. Brown, 113 S.C. 513, 101 S.E.
847 (1920) ; State v. Moody, 94 S.C. 26, 77 S.E. 713 (1913) ; State v. Watson,
94 S.C. 458, 78 S.E. 324 (1913) ; State v. Coyle, 86 S.C. 81, 67 S.E. 24 (1910) ;
State v. McKellar, 85 S.C, 236, 67 S.E. 314 (1910) ; State v. Stockman, 82
S.C. 388, 64 S.E. 595 (1909); State v. Thrailkill, 71 S.C. 136, 50 S.E. 551
(1905) ; State v. Hutto, 66 S.C. 449, 45 S.E. 13 (1903) ; State v. Whittle, 50
S.C. 297, 37 S.E. 923 (1901) ; State v. Petsch, 43 S.C. 132, 20 S.E. 993 (1895) ;
State v. Sullivan, 43 S.C. 205, 21 S.E. 4 (1895); State v. Symmes, 40 S.C. 383,
19 S.E. 16 (1894); State v. Wyse, 33 S.C. 582, 12 S.E. 556 (1891) ; State v.
Jackson, 32 S.C. 27, 10 S.E. 769 (1890) ; State v. McGreer, 13 S.C. 464 (1880).
14. State v. McGee, 185 S.C. 184, 193 S.E. 303 (1937).
15. State v. Burnett, 210 S.C. 348, 42 S.E.2d 71Q (1947); State v. Hollis,
108 S.C. 442, 95 S.E. 74 (1918); State v. Moody, 94 S.C. 26, 77 S.E. 713
(1912); State v. Thrailkill, 71 S.C. 136, 50 S.E. 551 (1905); State v. Foster,
66 S.C. 469, 45 S.E. 1 (1903); State v. Whittle, 59 S.C. 297, 37 S.E. 923
(1901).
16. State v. Jackson, 32 S.C. 27, 10 S.E. 769 (1889).
17. State v. Gandy, 113 S.C. 147, 101 S.E. 644 (1919); State v. Watson,
94 S.C. 458, 78 S.E. 324 (1913); State v. McKellar, 85 S.C. 236, 67 S.E.
314 (1910); State v. Stockman, 82 S.C. 388, 64 S.E. 595 (1909); State v.
Hutto, 66 S.C. 449, 45 S.E. 13 (1903) ; State v. Petsch, 43 S.C. 132, 20 S.E.
993 (1895) ; State v. Sullivan, 43 S.C. 205, 21 S.E. 4 (1895) ; State v. Symmes,
40 S.C. 383, 19 S.E. 16 (1894); State v. Wyse, 33 S.C. 582, 12 S.E. 556
(1891) ; State v. McGreer, 13 S.C. 464 (1880).
18. E.g., State v. McAlister, 149 S.C. 367, 147 S.E. 310 (1929); State v.
Strickland, 147 S.C. 514, 145 S.E. 404 (1928); State v. Peak, 134 S.C. 329,
133 S.E. 31 (1926) ; State v. Harvey, 110 S.C. 274, 96 S.E. 399 (1918) ; State
v. Stockman, 82 S.C. 388, 64 S.E. 595 (1909); State v. Dean, 72 S.C. 74,
51 S.E. 524 (1905) ; State v. Foster, 66 S.C. 469, 45 S.E. 1 (1903) ; State v.
Petsch, 43 S.C. 132, 20 S.E. 993 (1895) ; State v. Wyse, 33 S.C. 582, 12 S.E.
556 (1891) ; State v. Beckham, 24 S.C. 283 (1886).
19. State v. Foster, 66 S.C. 469, 45 S.E. 1 (1903).
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sonably calculated to bring on difficulty deprives the defendant
of the plea.20 This is true even if the language is directed toward someone under the care of the person who is provoked into
attack rather than at him personally. 21 The right of self-defense
is not lost when the opprobrious words are used in reply to a
similar attack. 22 The use of insulting words alone does not
justify the use of force, and the person replying with force is
not without fault, 23 but words accompanied by a hostile act may
justify the use of force. 24 Despite the impassioned plea of one
self-styled "old-fashioned" judge who believed that men should
"fight for their women," impugning the chastity of a woman
25
does not give her family or friends the right to use force.
A simple trespass is not such fault as to bar self-defense. 2 A
trespass reasonably calculated to precipitate a conflict is.27 Thus,
going on the premises of one with whom the defendant had had
previous difficulties that same afternoon might be such fault as
2
to preclude the defense.

The prevention of an unlawful act is not a fault in bringing on
an encounter. 20 One may use force to prevent the illegal act only
if the act is committed in his presence and only after protest.30
The touching of another person is sometimes privileged. Thus
that touching is not considered fault. A father, for example,
has the right to chastise his son.31 A Negro on a street car has
20. State v. Woodham, 162 S.C. 492, 160 S.E. 885 (1931); State v. Council,

129 S.C. 116, 123 S.E. 788 (1924); State v. Davis, 121 S.C. 350, 113 S.E. 491
(1922) ; State v. English, 115 S.C. 535, 106 S.E. 781 (1920) ; State v. Duncan,
86 S.C. 370, 68 S.E. 684 (1910); State v. Lee, 85 S.C. 101, 67 S.E. 141 (1910);
State v. Rowell, 75 S.C. 494, 56 S.E. 23 (1906).
21. State v. Schuler, 116 S.C. 152, 107 .S.E. 147 (1921); State v. Ferguson,
91 S.C. 235, 74 S.E. 502 (1912).
22. State v. Wright, 161 S.C. 64, 159 S.E. 492 (1931).
23. State v. Heyward, 197 S.C. 371, 15 S.E.2d 669 (1941) ; State v. Morrison,
121 S.C. 11, 113 S.E. 304 (1922); State v. Driggers. 84 S.C. 526, 66 S.E. 1042
(1910) ; State v. Jackson, 32 S.C. 27, 10 S.E. 769 (1890) ; State v. Jacobs, 28
S.C. 29, 4 S.E. 799 (1888).
24. State v. Mason, 115 S.C. 214, 105 S.E. 286 (1920); State v. Jackson, 32
S.C. 27, 10 S.E. 769 (1890) ; State v. Turner, 29 S.C. 34, 6 S.E. 891 (1888).
25. State v. Swygert, 130 S.C. 91, 114, 124 S.E. 636, 643 (1924).
26. State v. Bradley, 126 S.C. 528, 120 S.E. 240 (1923) ; State v. Emerson,
78 S.C. 83, 58 S.E. 974 (1907).
27. State v. Bradley, 126 S.C. 528, 120 S.E. 240 (1923).
28. State v. Brown, 113 S.C. 513, 101 S.E. 847 (1920).
29, State v. Burdette, 118 S.C. 164, 101 S.E. 664 (1919) (illegal intercourse
with sister of person using force) ; State v. Douglas, 115 S.C. 482, 101 S.E. 648
(1919) (elopement of underage girl).
30. State v. Burdette, 118 S.C. 164, 101 S.E. 664 (1919).
31. State v. Starks, 88 S.C. 122, 70 S.E. 436 (1911).
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the right to steady himself by touching a white passenger, but
the court held that the privilege might be lost if there were no
82
apology with the proper amount of deference.
Although a person is initially without fault in bringing on a
difficulty, he may be at fault, and thus lose the right of selfdefense, by responding with a disproportionate amount of
force. 3 The amount of force justified is not limited to the degree
or quantity of the opposing force but rather can be that amount
3 4
reasonably necessary for self-protection.
On occasion persons at fault in bringing on a difficulty have
asked the courts to adopt a rule allowing them the right of selfdefense when their adversary initiates the use of force likely to
cause death. The arguments have never persuaded the court.3,
Fault is also found in one who opposes the lawful use of force
as prescribed by the rules in the sections immediately following.
2. Resisting Unlawful Arrest. A person has the right to resist

unlawful arrest, in order to regain his liberty, 6 even to the
extent of taking the life of his aggressor if that be necessary.31
The circumstances under which the person being unlawfully
arrested could kill to resist the unlawful arrest have varied. An
early case stated that there was no distinction between the right
to resist a bodily injury and the right to resist an invasion of
personal liberty. 8 The jury was to determine if the facts and

circumstances of each case justified "the taking of the life of the
person who shall seemingly jeopardize . . . the liberty of the
32. State v. Wilson, 115 S.C. 248, 105 S.E. 341 (1920).

33. E.g., State v. Amburgey, 206 S.C. 426, 34 S.E2d 779 (1945); State v.

Jones, 133 S.C. 167, 130 S.E. 747 (1925) ; Golden v. State, 1 S.C. 292 (1870) ;

State v. Lazarus, 1 Mill. Const. 34 (S.C. 1817); State v. Wood, 1 Bay 351

(S.C. 1794).

34. State v. Campbell, 111 S.C. 112, 96 S.E. 543 (1918).
35. E.g., State v. Randall, 118 S.C. 158, 110 S.E. 123 (1921) ; State v. Jacobs,

28 S.C. 29, 4 S.E. 799 (1888); State v. Beckham, 24 S.C. 283 (1886).

36. State v. Jackson, 227 S.C. 271, 87 S.E2d 681 (1955); State v. Robertson, 191 S.C. 509, 5 S.E.2d 285 (1939); State v. Francis, 152 S.C. 17, 149
S.E. 348 (1929) ; State v. Lowman, 134 S.C. 485, 133 S.E. 457 (1926) ; State
v. Bethune, 112 S.C. 100, 99 S.E. 753 (1919); State v. Shaw, 104 S.C. 359,
89 S.E. 322 (1916) ; State v. Davis, 53 S.C. 150, 31 S.E. 62 (1898) ; State v.
Higgins, 51 S.C. 51, 28 S.E. 15 (1897) ; State v. Wimbush, 9 S.C. 309 (1878) ;
State v. Hailey, 2 Strob. 73 (S.C. 1847); Florence v. Berry, 61 S.C. 237,

39 S.E. 389 (1901)
(1894) (dictum).

(dictum); Davis v. Sanders, 40 S.C. 507, 19 S.E. 138

37. State v. Jackson, 227 S.C. 271, 87 S.E.2d 681 (1955) ; State v. Robert-

son, 191 S.C. 509, 5 S.E2d 285 (1939); State v. Bethune, 112 S.C. 100, 99
S.E. 753 (1919) ; State v. Davis, 53 S.C. 150, 31 S.E. 62 (1898).
38. State v. Davis, 53 S.C. 150, 31 S.E. 62 (1898). Contra, State v. Bethune,
112 S.C. 100, 99 S.E. 753 (1919).
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A later case40 said that "an illegal arrest is
usually nothing more than a trespass, and does not excuse a
homicide committed in resisting it, unless it appears that such
killing was necessary in self-defense .... ,,41 This rule was con42 in which the court said that a person
tinued in State v. Franis
person assailed.

is "justified in using . . . a deadly weapon only where he has

reason to apprehend an injury greater than the mere unlawful
arrest... . ,,4 and "has no right... to take human life to prevent
a mere trespass upon his person or liberty .... ,,44 In the latest
case involving resistance of unlawful arrest 4 5 the person being
arrested was said to have the right to use such force as was
apparently necessary to accomplish his deliverance and no more.
The problem in cases involving the defense of resisting unlawful arrest is often whether or not the instant arrest is lawful.
Without covering the law of arrest extensively, some general
guidelines can be drawn. The 1962 South Carolina Code, section
17-251, provides: "Upon (a) view of a felony committed, (b) certain information that a felony has been committed or (c) view of
a larceny committed, any person may arrest the felon or
thief .... ,,"0 Under this section any person may arrest on reliable information that a felony has been committed, and there is
a duty on the part of the person being arrested to submit to the
arrest.4 7 Section 17-253 provides: "The sheriffs... of this State

may arrest without warrant any and all persons who, within
their view, violate any of the crhninal laws of this State if such
arrest be made at the time of such violation of law or immediately thereafter.148 An officer may not arrest without a warrant
for misdemeanors committed outside his view or hearing 49 and
39. State v. Davis, 53 S.C. 150, 154, 31 S.E. 62, 63 (1898).
40. State v. Byrd, 72 S.C. 104, 51 S.E. 542 (1905).
41. Id. at 107, 51 S.E. at 543.

42. 152 S.C. 17, 149 S.E. 348 (1929).
43. Id. at 39, 149 S.E. at 356.
44. Id. at 39, 149 S.E. at 356.
45. State v. Jackson, 227 S.C. 271, 87 S.E.2d 681 (1955).
46. S.C. COD ANN. § 17-251 (1962). See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-252 (1962)

for other circumstances under which citizens may arrest.

47. Burton v. McNeill, 196 S.C. 250, 13 S.E.2d 10 (1941) ; State v. Griffin,

74 S.C. 412, 54 S.E. 603 (1906).

48. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-253 (1962); accord, State v. Bowen, 17 S.C.

58 (1882).
49. In State v. Williams, 36 S.C. 493, 15 S.E. 554 (1892), by implication,
a legal arrest could have been made by the mayor of Spartanburg for a dis-

turbance of the peace committed out of his sight but within his hearing.
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the person being arrested has the right to resist."° The officer
may arrest without a warrant, however, for offenses not committed in his sight in special circumstances indicating an emergency. 5 ' If the warrant does not meet the technical requirements for a valid warrant the arrest is invalid.5 2 If, however,

the officer is only a de facto officer, the person being arrested
3
has no more right to resist than if he were a de jure officer.
The right to resist an unlawful arrest does not attach merely
because a person is told that he is under arrest,5 4 or because the
officer fails to state his official character, 55 or because the officer knocks on a person's front door to inquire about a misdemeanor not committed in his presence.560 In all of these instances
the person should make inquiry into the authority for the arrest.
Even if the right to resist unlawful arrest comes into existence
by action on the part of the officer, the right terminates when
the officer desists from his illegal purpose and that fact is
apparent to the person sought to be arrested. 57 Of course, the
fact that an officer has a valid warrant for arrest does not make
his killing a culpable homicide if the authority of the officer is
not made known and the killing can be justified on another
ground.58
3. Effecting a Lawful Arrest. A person may justifiably use
force in effecting a lawful arrest. If he uses force to effect an
unlawful arrest, he is criminally liable.5 9 The person making
the unlawful arrest cannot thereafter avail himself of the plea
of self-defense because he is not without fault in provoking the
50. State v. Francis, 152 S.C. 17, 149 S.E. 348 (1929) ; State v. Randall, 118
S.C. 158, 110 S.E. 123 (1921); State v. Bethune, 112 S.C. 100, 99 S.E. 753
(1919); State v. Shaw, 104 S.C. 359, 89 S.E. 322 (1916); State v. Davis, 53
S.C. 150, 31 S.E. 62 (1898).
51. State v. Rivers, 186 S.C. 221, 196 S.E. 6 (1938) (person arrested hunting persons with whom he had earlier fought); State v. Sims, 16 S.C. 486
(1882) (fresh pursuit by police) ; cf., Town of Branchville v. Felder, 86 S.C.
280, 68 S.E. 575 (1910) ; Percival v. Bailey, 70 S.C. 72, 49 S.E. 7 (1904).
52. State v. Higgins, 51 S.C. 51, 28 S.E. 15 (1897).
53. State v. Messervy, 86 S.C. 503, 68 S.E. 766 (1910) (alternate holding).
54. State v. Francis, 152 S.C. 17, 149 S.E. 348 (1929).
55. State v. Luster, 178 S.C. 199, 182 S.E. 427 (1935) ; State v. Shaw 104
S.C. 359, 89 S.E. 322 (1916) ; State v. Byrd, 72 S.C. 104, 51 S.E. 542 (1905).
56. State v. Heyward, 197 S.C. 371, 15 S.E.2d 669 (1941).
57. State v. Francis, 152 S.C. 17, 149 S.E. 348 (1929).
58. State v. Lowman, 134 S.C. 485, 133 S.E. 457 (1926).
59. State v. Randall, 118 S.C. 158, 110 S.E. 123 (1921) ; State v. Jones, 104
S.C. 141, 88 S.E. 444 (1916); State v. Whittle, 59 S.C. 297, 37 S.E. 923
(1901).
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incident.60 In this area, as in the area of resisting unlawful
arrest, there is the problem of determining which arrests are
lawful. This problem will not be discussed again here as a
lawful arrest makes resistance unlawful and lawful resistance
means that the attempted arrest is unlawful. Assuming that an
arrest is lawful there is a limit to the amount of force which the
officer may use in effecting the arrest. The amount of force
justified depends on the response of the person being arrested.6 1
A classic example of the justification of use of force great
enough to kill is given in State v. Anderson.6 2
But then suppose, that either before the arrest, or after the
arrest, B draws his sword and assaults A, and A presseth
upon him either to take or detain him, and in the conflict,
B kills A, it is murder in B; or if A kills B, it is justifiable,
63
and no felony in A.

Passive resistance will not justify a killing 4 and active resistance does not justify an unlimited use of force.(6
The force applied must have a due regard to the purpose it
is to accomplish. It is allowed, when it may be necessary to
overcome, by its interposition, the violence which is opposed
to prevent the due exercise of the authority with which the
officer is charged. If it proceeds beyond the limit of the
necessity which originally permitted its use, it is no justification."
The later case of State v. Frankli 6 7 leaves some doubt in this
area and suggests that the officer may be justified in using
deadly force in effecting a capture whether or not his life is
endangered. There the defendant was convicted on a charge of
murder of a constable. The judge charged the jury that "if
60. State v. Randall, 118 S.C. 158, 110 S.E. 123 (1921).
61. Golden v. State, 1 S.C. 292 (1870) ; State v. Anderson, 1 Hill 327 (S.C.
1833); Arthur v. Wells, 2 Mill. Const. 314 (S.C. 1818) (a civil case upholding
liability for shooting runaway slave).
62. 1 Hill 327 (S.C. 1833).
63. Id. at 344-45. The court purports to quote 2 HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 83 (1847), but the language there is ". . . is it murder
in B or if A kills B is it justifiable and no felony in A?" (emphasis added.)
64. State v. Anderson, 1 Hill 327 (S.C. 1833).
65. Golden v. State, 1 S.C. 292 (1870).
66. Id. at 302.
67. 80 S.C. 332, 60 S.E. 953 (1908), aff'd sub nor. Franklin v. South Caro-

lina, 218 U.S. 161 (1910).
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[a man] refuses to submit to the arrest, then the officer has the
right to go to whatever length is necessary to make him submit."6 The court said the circuit judge "made no mistake."
The precise issue involved in the case was whether the officer
could break into the house when he received no response to his
knock, but the statements may be authority for the proposition
that an officer may use deadly force for the purpose of effectuating a capture. But in State v. Jones60 there is dictum to the effect
that these rules apply only when arrest is resisted but not when
an escape is attempted. The court said: "[I]t is better that one
guilty of the commission of a misdemeanor escape than his life
be forfeited or that he suffer serious bodily injury."
In one interesting civil case for false imprisonment the judge
"correctly charged... that one making the arrest must be actuated by good motives with one view and that of assisting in
bringing to justice a felon, who had violated the law, and that
he did not have an ulterior motive.1 70 If this principle were
carried over to criminal cases, an officer or private citizen, making an otherwise lawful arrest, would be criminally liable for
his actions if the reason for the arrest were personal.
4. Defense of Habitation. "[A] man's house is his castle .... MI
Out of the underlying reason for this ancient maxim, rules have
been formulated giving a person the right to use force in expelling unwanted persons from his home under some circumstances.
2
The landmark case in this area, State v. Bradley,7
wisely divides
the law of habitation into four situations: First, when the occupant is the slayer and stands on the right to protect his habitation, apart from the plea of self-defense; second, when the
occupant is also the slayer and stands upon his right of selfdefense claiming immunity not from the right to protect his
habitat, but from the law of retreat; third, when the occupant is
the slain and the homicide occurred while he was in the exercise
of his right to protect his habitation; and fourth, when the occupant is also the slain, and the homicide occurred while he was
attempting to eject a trespasser from a part of the premises outside of his habitation.
68,
1013
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 338, 60 S.E. at 955. But cf. State v. Suddeth, 74 S.C. 498, 54 S.E.
(1906).
211 S.C. 300, 305, 44 S.E.2d 841, 843-44 (1947).
Safran v. Meyer, 103 S.C. 356, 364, 88 S.E. 3, 4 (1916).
3 CoKE, INsTiTUsS 162 (1644).
126 S.C. 528, 120 S.E. 240 (1923).
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In the first situation the owner relies on the right of persons
within the house to keep aggressors out. Thus when a man is
assaulted in his home he may use such force as is necessary to
protect himself or a member of his family from injury and
combine such force as is reasonably necessary to eject the assailant, even to the extent of taking life.3 If the person to be
expelled is an invited guest7 4 or accompanying an officer on a
lawful arrest," or on the premises to settle a quarrel,t 6 there
must be a request by the owner that the person leave prior to
the use of force for expulsion. The person need not leave immediately but has a reasonable time in which to depart.7 If the
person requested to leave refuses, the force necessary or apparently necessary to eject him may be used.7 8 A guest in the home
of the owner has the same opportunity to defend the habitation
"as if he were under his own roof or within his own doors."79
The proprietor of a business has the right to eject a trespasser
by using such force, short of killing the trespasser, as is necessary to accomplish the ejection. 0 The right to defense of habitation ceases as soon as the danger has passed.81 It is possible
that the right to defend the habitation extends beyond the house
itself. In State v. Brooks82 the person slain was two hundred
73. State v. Jackson, 227 S.C. 271, 87 S.E.2d 681 (1955) ; State v. Sparks,
179 S.C. 135, 183 S.E. 719 (1936); State v. Bradley, 126 S.C. 528, 120 S.E.
240 (1923).
74. State v. Bodie, 213 S.C. 325, 49 S.E.2d 575 (1948); State v. Starnes,
213 S.C. 304, 49 S.E.2d 209 (1948); State v. Osborne, 200 S.C. 504, 21 S.E.2d
178 (1942) (appeal from retrial 202 S.C. 473, 25 S.E.2d 561, cert. denied, 320
U.S. 763 (1943) did not involve this point); State v. Sparks, 179 S.C. 135,
183 S.E. 719 (1936) ; State v. Waldrop, 73 S.C. 60, 52 S.E. 793 (1905) ; State
v. McIntosh 40 S.C. 349, 18 S.E. 1033 (1894) ; State v. Lazarus, 1 Mill. Const.
34 (S.C. 1817) ; State v. Bradley, 126 S.C. 528, 120 S.E. 240 (1923) (dictum).
75. State v. Williams, 76 S.C. 135, 56 S.E. 783 (1907).
76. State v. Petit, 144 S.C. 452, 142 S.E. 725 (1928).

77. Id.
78. State v. Starnes, 213 S.C. 304, 49 S.E.2d 209 (1948) ; State v. Sparks,
179 S.C. 135, 183 S.E. 719 (1936) ; State v. Williams, 76 S.C. 135, 56 S.E. 783

(1907).

79. State v. Bodie, 213 S.C. 325. 329, 49 S.E.2d 575, 577 (1948) ; State v.

Osborne, 200 S.C. 504, 515, 21 S.E.2d 178, 182 (1942), quoting from Armot.,

25 A.L.R. 508, 522 (1923).

80. State v. Rogers, 130 S.C. 426, 126 S.E. 329 (1925) (dictum). The dictum

is supported by State v. Starnes, 213 S.C. 304, 316, 49 S.E.2d 209, 213 (1948)
in which the court says "the occupant of a home or a place of business [may]
use such force as may be reasonably necessary.. . to eject a trespasser ....
The incident involved in this case took place in a building which was both
defendant's home and his place of business.
81. State v. Stockman, 82 S.C. 388, 64 S.E. 595 (1909).
82. 79 S.C. 144, 60 S.E. 518 (1908).
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yards from the house, but the court, in holding that the defendant did not have to retreat, gave as the reason that "defendant
has a right to eject [the trespasser]." 83 In State v. Bradley84 the
right of the occupant to expel a trespasser was "limited to the
place of his habitation (or perhaps of his curtilage [citing State
v. Brooks] ), it did not exist . . . at a more remote place on the
premises. . ... ,5 Defense of habitation is not available when

both parties to the fracas stand on equal ground, i.e., both have
the right to be in the habitation. 6
The situation in which the occupant is the slayer and stands
on his right to self-defense claiming immunity from the law of
retreat is covered in the section on retreat.
In the third and fourth situations the person slain is the owner
of the premises. If the owner in using force is protecting his
habitation, then the slayer is not without fault in bringing on
the incident and cannot rely on the justification of self-defense.8 7
If, however, the ejection is wrongful under the principles previously discussed, the person being ejected is without fault in
bringing on the incident and can rely on a plea of self-defense
providing the other elements are established. 8
5. Defense of Others. Under certain circumstances a person is
justified in using force to protect a third person. The South
Carolina rule on defense of others was laid down in State v.
Cook. 19 "[A] person who [interferes in a difficulty between two
others] will not be allowed the benefit of the plea of self-defense,
unless such plea would have been available to the person whose
part he took in case he himself had done the killing....,,9 This
rule has been adhered to in the later cases.9 1 The person rescued
83. Id. at 149, 60 S.E. at 520.
84. 126 S.C. 528, 120 S.E. 240 (1923).
85. Id. at 537, 120 S.E. at 243.
86. State v. Smith, 226 S.C. 418, 85 S.E.2d 409 (1955).
87. State v. Burnett, 210 S.C. 348, 42 S.E.2d 710 (1947) ; State v. Bradley
126 S.C. 528, 120 S.E. 240 (1923).
88. State v. Bradley, 126 S.C. 528, 120 S.E. 240 (1923). But cf. State v.
Brown, 113 S.C. 513, 101 S.E. 847 (1920) in which the court said fault could
be found by the jury from the fact that defendant went on the premises of a
person with whom he had had a previous difficulty that day.
89. 78 S.C. 253, 59 S.E. 862 (1907).
90. Id. at 257, 59 S.E. at 863, quoting from F. WHARTON, THE LAw oF
HomIc E 332 (3d ed. 1907).
91. See State v. Hewitt, 205 S.C. 207, 31 S.E.2d 257 (1944) ; State v. Francis,
152 S.C. 17, 149 S.E. 348 (1929); State v. Hays, 121 S.C. 163, 113 S.E. 362

(1922) ; State v. Brown, 108 S.C. 490, 95 S.E. 61 (1918).
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must have had no other reasonable means of escape 92 and must

have been without fault in provoking the incident.9 3 The person
claiming the right must likewise be without fault in provoking
the incident.94 The defense is not available unless there is a
necessity9" or apparent necessity 90 to use the force. Although
some of the cases refer to the right of a father and son to protect
each other" or of someone to defend another who is his spouse,
parent or child,98 other cases make clear that the right extends
to a relative, friend or bystander. 99
D. Retreat

A person using force likely to cause death or great bodily
harm may not ordinarily claim the justification of self-defense
unless there is no reasonable means of escape. 10 0 The general
rule is that the retreat doctrine is not applicable to cases involving mere batteries.1 1 When the battery is accompanied by use
of force likely to cause death or great bodily harm, there is a
duty to retreat. 10 2 The reasonable means of escape must be one
which would be apparent to a man of ordinary prudence and
courage. 103 The escape must be made only if it can be accom92. State v. Hays, 121 S.C. 163, 113 S.E. 362 (1922).
93. Id.; State v. Cook, 78 S.C. 253, 59 S.E. 862 (1907).
94. State v. Hays, 121 S.C. 163, 113 S.E. 362 (1922) ; State v. Harvey, 110
S.C. 274, 96 S.E. 399 (1918) ; State v. Cook, 78 S.C. 253, 59 S.E. 862 (1907).
95. Cases cited note 94 supra.
96. State v. Petit, 144 S.C. 452, 142 S.E. 725 (1928). In this case the person slain was the one who could have asserted the defense. The issue was to
determine who was at fault in bringing on the incident.
97. State v. Douglas, 115 S.C. 483, 101 S.E. 648 (1919).
98. State v. Hewitt, 205 S.C. 207, 31 S.E.2d 257 (1944).
99. State v. Hays, 121 S.C. 163, 113 S.E. 362 (1922) ; State v. Brown, 108
S.C. 490, 95 S.E. 61 (1918) (mentions "friends" and "relatives" only).
100. State v. Council, 129 S.C. 116, 123 S.E. 788 (1924) ; State v. Hill, 129
S.C. 166, 123 S.E. 817 (1924); State v. Thomas, 103 S.C. 316, 88 S.E. 20
(1915) ; State v. Chastain, 85 S.C. 64, 67 S.E. 6 (1910) ; State v. McKellar,
85 S.C. 236, 67 S.E. 314 (1910).
101. 6 CJ.S. Assault and Battery § 92 (1937). The 1966 Cumulative Supplement to this section lists the South Carolina case of State v. Smith, 226
S,C. 418, 85 S.E.2d 409 (1955), as following the general rule. That case held,
however, that the defendant was immune from the retreat doctrine because he
was a guest in the home in which the alleged assault and battery took place.
This author has found no South Carolina case directly on point.
102. State v. Davis, 121 S.C. 350, 113 S.E. 491 (1922) (pitchfork); State
v. McKellar, 85 S.C. 236, 67 S.E. 314 (1910) (pistol). See State v. Smith,
226 S.C. 418, 85 S.E.2d 409 (1955) (knife) ; State v. Kennedy, 143 S.C. 318,
141 S.E. 559 (1928) (knife); State v. Quick, 138 S.C. 147, 135 S.E. 800
(1926) (pistol).
103. E.g., State v. Council, 129 S.C. 116, 123 S.E. 788 (1924); State v.
Thomas, 103 S.C. 316, 88 S.E. 20 (1916).
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plished without increasing his danger, 10 4 or apparently or probably increasing it.' °5 One who is on his own premises need not
retreat. This applies to one who is in his own home or within
its curtilage,10 6 or in his place of business,' 07 or on his own
property outside the curtilage, 0 8 or is a guest in the home of
another. 0 9 In South Carolina immunity from retreat even applies to a club member in club rooms. 1 0
The rules were not always this way. In one case the court held
that a person "attacked on his own premises by the deceased who
was at that time on the public highway, or where he had a right
to be .

.

. was bound to retreat. . . 2.1"' In a case decided the

same year the court held that the defendant was bound to retreat
in the face of a simple assault before taking the life of the
assailant."12 Apparently neither counsel nor the court in the
later case addressed themselves to the fact that defendant as
well as the person slain claimed the right to possession of the
house. The rule requiring retreat when the aggressor was in a
place where he had a right to be was short-lived. In State v.
Gibbs11 both combatants were on their own property and the
defendant had no duty to retreat. Similarly, when both parties
live in the same home, 114 or are guests in the same home, 1" or
are fellow-workmen at their job,'" neither is required to retreat.
104. State v. George, 119 S.C. 120, 111 S.E. 880 (1921); State v. Petsch,

43 S.C. 132, 20 S.E. 993 (1895).
105. State v. McGee, 185 S.C. 184, 193 S.E. 303 (1937); State v. Jones,

90 S.C. 290, 73 S.E. 177 (1912); State v. Rochester, 72 S.C. 194, 51 S.E.
685 (1905).
106. State v. Jackson, 227 S.C. 271, 87 S.E.2d 681 (1955); State v. Grantham, 224 S.C. 41, 77 S.E.2d 291 (1953); State v. Gibbs, 113 S.C. 256, 102
S.E. 333 (1920) ; State v. Brooks, 79 S.C. 144, 60 S.E. 518 (1908).
107. State v. Kennedy, 143 S.C. 318, 141 S.E. 559 (1928) ; State v. Rogers,
130 S.C. 426, 126 S.E. 329 (1925) ; State v. Gordon, 128 S.C. 422, 122 S.E. 501
(1924) ; State v. Bowers, 122 S.C. 275, 115 S.E. 303 (1923).
108. State v. Cleland, 148 S.C. 86, 145 S.E. 628 (1928); State v. Quick, 138
S.C. 147, 135 S.E. 800 (1926); State v. Bradley, 126 S.C. 528, 120 S.E. 240
(1923).
109. State v. Smith, 226 S.C. 418, 85 S.E.2d 409 (1955) ; State v. Osborne,
202 S.C. 473, 25 S.E.2d 561 (1942), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 763 (1943) ; State v.
Osborne, 200 S.C. 504, 21 S.E.2d 178 (1942).
110. State v. Marlowe, 120 S.C. 205, 112 S.E. 921 (1921).
111. State v. Rochester, 72 S.C. 194, 203, 51 S.E. 685, 688 (1905).
112. State v. Waldrop, 73 S.C. 60, 52 S.E. 793 (1905).
113. 113 S.C. 256, 102 S.E. 333 (1920); accord, State v. Hewitt, 205 S.C.
207, 31 S.E.2d 257 (1944), where deceased was in the public highway.
114. State v. Grantham, 224 S.C. 41, 77 S.E.2d 291 (1953). But see State v.
Stevenson, 85 S.C. 247, 67 S.E. 239 (1910).
115. State v. Smith, 226 S.C. 418, 85 S.E.2d 409 (1955).
116. State v. Kennedy, 143 S.C. 318, 141 S.E. 559 (1928) ; State v. Gordon,
128 S.C. 422, 122 S.E. 501 (1924).
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The fellow-workmen need not be in an enclosure but may be outside on the job. 1 7 The person claiming immunity from retreat
must be at the site of his job for a purpose related to his employment."" Defendants from time to time have pressed the
court to give immunity from retreat when they are in a place
where they have a right to be. This argument has never prevailed. Thus a defendant in the public road," 9 or on the ground
surrounding a store where the public was invited,'120 or in the
kitchen of a restaurant to complain about the food,' 21 has a duty
to retreat. But if the defendant goes on the land of another to
prevent an unlawful act, he is under no duty to retreat. 22
III. ARMAS OF STUY FOR PossMI

CHANGES

A. Defense of Others.
In South Carolina today a person coming to the rescue of a
person in distress takes the chance that he may be committing a
criminal offense. For the person rescued may have been at fault
in bringing on the incident or may not have availed himself of
a opportunity to retreat. The reason for the rule has been stated
as follows:
[T]he opposite rule would allow the innocent man who had
been forced to strike in self-defense to be killed with impunity merely because appearances happened to be against him
at the moment a partisan of his antagonist reached the
scene of conflict. The duty seems urgent to enforce rather
than relax the rule which admits of no excuse for taking
123
human life except necessity.

117. State v. Gordon, 128 S.C. 422, 122 S.E. 501 (1924). Both men were
working at chopping trees on a farm.
118. State v. Davis, 214 S.C. 34, 51 S.E.2d 86 (1948).
119. State v. McGee, 185 S.C. 184, 193 S.E. 303 (1937); State v. Babb,
88 S.C. 395, 70 S.E. 309 (1911); State v. Corley, 43 S.C. 127, 20 S.E. 989
(1895).
120. State v. Peeples, 126 S.C. 422, 120 S.E. 361 (1923).
121. State v. Trammell, 40 S.C. 331, 18 S.E. 940 (1894).
122. State v. Burdette, 118 S.C. 164, 101 S.E. 664 (1919). But see State
v. Hardin, 114 S.C. 280, 103 S.E. 557 (1920). In the latter case the court refused to charge that a police officer attacked in the lawful exercise of his
duties was under no duty to retreat. The opinion does not specify why the
refusal of the charge was rightful, but there is some indication that the facts
did not justify such a charge.
123. State v. Cook, 78 S.C. 253, 259, 59 S.E. 862, 864 (1907).
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Mr. Justice Gary, dissenting in the same case, gave his reasons
for using a rule allowing the use of force upon a reasonable,
bona fide belief in the necessity for its use as follows:
[A] person may set up the plea of self-defense if he actually
believes he is in imminent danger of losing his life or suffering serious bodily harm, and under all the circumstances
as they existed at the time the violence was inflicted the
jury thinks he had just grounds for forming such belief;
yet,.., a rule more severe is applied when a person takes
the life of another in order to prevent a felony upon a third
party, although the law imposes upon him the duty of preventing such felony. It seems to me that there is even
stronger reason for permitting the party taking the life of
another to act upon a bona fide and well founded belief in
124
the latter than in the former case.

Leaving aside the questions of whether someone might be held
for the killing in the first example or whether the law does
impose a penalty for failure to prevent a felony in the second
statement, the real issue is whether the law desires to encourage
intervention by a third party who reasonably believes another
needs his assistance. Should the innocent party who now has
the upper hand be protected as against the innocent victim of
crime who cries out for help? It is submitted that the law
should encourage intervention by giving a justification for a
force used with a reasonable belief in its necessity. The person
who goes to the aid of a distressed fellow-citizen is rare enough
without the added factor of possible criminal sanction for his
supposed heroic deed.
B. Retreat
The immunity from retreat for one on his own premises is
founded on the premise that a person confronted in his home
should not be required to abandon his home to the attacker or
be liable for the consequences if he remains. The policy question
raised by the South Carolina cases is the scope of the immunity
from retreat. South Carolina has wisely refrained, as seen in the
section on retreat, from extending immunity to anyone who is
124. State v. Cook, 78 S.C. 253, 261-62, 59 S.E. 862, 865 (1907)
opinion).
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in a place where he has a right to be.' 2 5 The immunity has,

however, been extended beyond desirable bounds. The detriment
to a person in his club room or a person chopping wood in the
forest and probably to a person who is a guest in another's home
of being required to retreat does not justify the loss of a life. It
may be easy to say that the person killed was hoist with his own
petard, but the law can and should protect him from the effect
of the blast by requiring retreat except when a person is within
his own home or within his place of work.
0. Illegality of Arrest as Standard of Fault
In South Carolina today the criminal liability of the arresting
officer who uses force in effecting the arrest and the person
being arrested who uses force in resisting the arrest is determined
by whether the arrest is legal. The arresting officer may be criminally liable for the use of force in effecting an illegal arrest.
The person being arrested is justified in using force to prevent
an illegal arrest but is at fault if he resists a legal arrest. The
"unlawful arrest" standard is a highly complex legal standard.
Judges often disagree on whether a particular arrest is in fact
legal. Standards of this complexity ought not determine the
criminal liability of a police officer. The police officer should
be able to use force in making an arrest which he reasonably
believes to be lawful. At the same time persons being arrested
by a known police officer should not be able to resist an unlawful
arrest unless the elements of self-defense are present. Modern
habeas corpus proceedings tend to make the period of illegal
detention shorter. Thus the protection of the policeman weighs
heavier in the balance. The requirement of a reasonable belief in
the legality of the arrest would mean that the results of relatively
few cases would be changed, but, it is believed, those cases which
might be changed would reach a better result.
The recommended changes in the law of self-defense are suggestions only. It may well be that the legislature or the courts
upon reflection would deem it wiser to continue the present law.
The points raised are indicative that certainly reflection, and
possibly reform, is needed.
WmLiAm

T. ToAL

125. For an example of a case espousing the opposite rule, see State v.
Jackson, 94 Ariz. 117, 382 P2d 229 (1963).
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